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Abstract
This article provides an introduction to the Symposium on the Competition Law of Dereg-
ulation. It surveys recent developments in this area and comments briefly on the symposium
participants’ contributions that are included in the book.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE NEED FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Karl M. Meessen*
I. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW APPROACH
Are the effects of regulation actually known? Only if they
are, or were, can we design the proper route towards deregula-
tion. Furthermore, experience shows that deregulation is hardly
ever complete. How are we to predict its outcome? Judge Rich-
ard Posner's observations, set out in the very first paragraph of
his paper, highlight the audacity of discussing the competition
law of deregulation within a forty-eighty hour symposium. It was
a mission impossible, albeit one befitting the Weimar venue, since
it was in Weimar, the "Cultural City of Europe 1999," where,
some two hundred years ago, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe had
written the drama of Faust whose predicament it was to strive for
ever higher goals.
Very much down-to-earth, Posner provided the tools of eco-
nomic analysis theory that allow us to tell misdirected regulatory
incentives from well-directed ones. Deregulation is bound, he
said, to proceed through tailor-made industry-by-industry and
country-by-country solutions. For purposes of legal and eco-
nomic research, however, looking beyond a particular industry
in a particular country is an absolute necessity.
II. LOOKING BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
Turning to the United States and focusing on securities reg-
ulation, Arthur Laby from the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion-as all the others disclaiming to speak on behalf of his
agency-explained when and how securities brokers were made
subject to prohibitory rules while advisers were granted the privi-
lege of being merely exposed to disclosure obligations. Laby de-
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fended that legislative technique as matching the respective
functions of, in the one case, shifting decision-making to the
provider of the service, or in the other case, of leaving it with the
customer. Peter Nobel, a Zurich attorney, professor in St. Gall,
and a member of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission,
pointed to self-regulation of the financial community through
codes of conduct as an alternative worth considering. Economic
analysis of the law indeed suggests confining regulatory interven-
tion to the minimum necessary to achieve the respective goal,
which, of course, depends on the respective business environ-
ment.
Japan is a special case. Yoshio Ohara, professor of competi-
tion law at Kaganawa University, explained the administrative-
guidance-led regulatory culture of his country and proceeded to
identify with regard to the Japanese policy of deregulation both
the external motives-U.S. and European Union pressure-and
internal motives-stimulating innovation and increasing de-
mand. He did so with a special emphasis on the telecommunica-
tions and aviation industries. Not surprisingly, Japan seems to
have a culture of deregulation as well, where potential competi-
tors are, for instance, taken by their hand through a "Manual for
Market Entry into Japanese Telecommunications Business."
Deregulating developing economies presents a particularly
arduous task. The unlikely reason is the subtle network of pri-
vate long-term Build, Own, Operate contracts concluded be-
tween international investors and their local partners. Dr. Nagla
Nassar, formerly with the International Center of Investment
Disputes of the World Bank and now a partner in a Cairo law
firm, quoted several standard clauses in full and explained them
as creating a most unfortunate communality of those two parties'
interests in sustaining the inefficiencies of such projects
throughout their lifetime. Dr. Martin Heubel, General Counsel
of Lurgi, with its worldwide contractor business, agreed: the
highly competitive bidding stage usually soon gives way to a long-
term dependency where moves towards privatization and dereg-
ulation risk jeopardizing the cashflow the contractor needs as a
return on investment and the local partner welcomes as a reve-
nue oriented fee.
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III. DEREGULATION IN CONTESTABLE AMD
NON-CONTESTABLE MARKETS
Nowhere would the mere undoing of regulation be enough,
least of all in the contract-vetted world described by Nassar. The
competition law of deregulation therefore, if it is to make the
invisible hand truly work, implies what one could call-borrow-
ing a term from the civil rights movement-affirmative action.
Competition law proper, as John Temple Lang put it in his dis-
cussion of Professor Gfinter Knieps' essay, must be supple-
mented by regulation in the sense of legal rules designed to
clear the bottlenecks left behind from the happy times of gov-
ernment owned or government organized monopoly. Referring
to telecommunications but introducing categories of broad ap-
plicability, Gfinter Knieps of the Freiburg Institute of Transpor-
tation and Regional Policy, called for special rules to deal with
transactions between contestable networks (e.g., telephone serv-
ers) and non-contestable bottlenecks (e.g., access to cables, en-
tries in directories, etc.). Dr. Temple Lang, Director of the Eu-
ropean Commission's division of competition law in the telecom-
munications and media industries, voiced no objections. He
added, though, that even after the usual transitory period some
regulatory law may continue to be needed to safeguard stan-
dards, sustain universal service, or pursue other public policy
objectives.
IV. INDUSTRIES IN THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION
A. Telecommunications
The trouble is that clearing bottlenecks is easier said than
done. In the real world, the notion of essential facilities must,
according to Knieps, be assessed by reference to the terms of
access to the respective bottleneck market, which eventually
comes down to evaluating prices with some risk of overregula-
tion. Germany provides the ready example. Part of the former
Federal Ministry of Telecommunication, while taking some addi-
tional staff from the Federal Cartel Office, was transformed into
the center piece of a regulatory authority to supervise the condi-
tions of access to the network, which is still owned by the former
monopolist. Helmut Schadow, Head of Division with the Fed-
eral Ministry of Telecommunications and Post, gave a detailed
report of its first nine months of vigorous activity. His favorable
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account of falling prices and rising standards was fully confirmed
by Rainer Liebich who was able to contribute the perspective of
the former general manager of AT&T, i.e., one of the most po-
tent potential entrants into the German telecommunications
market. Liebich described the industry as technology driven and
observed that whenever the scope for product differentiation
was exhausted, a shake-out would seem inevitable given the large
number of market participants.
B. TV
Structural activity, even though innovation is still going
strong, characterizes the newly if incompletely deregulated TV
market in Germany. Should that product market be considered
split into separate free television ("TV") and pay-TV markets?
Dr. Markus Wagemann of the Federal Cartel Office said yes, and
Dr. Ulrich Koch, General Counsel of Bertelsmann, one of the
world's largest media groups, implicated a negative response.
No matter whether German free-TV and pay-TV are considered
one market or two separate, adjacent markets, concerns with an-
ticompetitive spill-over effects from a pay-TV merger seem genu-
ine and may well have contributed to Bertelsmann's withdrawal
from a recentjoint venture project with the Kirch group. Refer-
ring to the ninety percent duopoly dominating the Italian TV
market, Claudio Cocuzza, a practicing lawyer from Milan, re-
minded participants of the pluralist ideals that should be pur-
sued by any competition and/or regulatory policy in the media
industry.
C. Aviation
If the European record of deregulating telecommunications
is good and if the record of deregulating the TV industry is at
best mixed, aviation is certainly lagging behind. Some of the
reasons listed by Dr. Romina Polley of the Oppenhoff & Rddler
law firm relate to the bilateral structure of the market with re-
gard to third state routes. The closed sky premise of the 1944
Chicago Convention' can only be opened up by bilateral agree-
ments between the two states at each end of a particular route.
In view of the uneven number of attractive destinations, Dr.
1. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, ICAO Doc. 7300/6.
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Robert Wolfger of Austrian Airlines expressed his favor of con-
tinuing to have the open sky agreements with the United States
negotiated by individual Member States rather than the Euro-
pean Union as a whole. Slots at airports with hub functions, fre-
quent flyer programs, and above all combined pricing for transit
passengers, however, seem self-inflicted obstacles to creating
truly contestable aviation markets. The basic tenets of the bottle-
neck theory expounded by Professor Knieps might help to rem-
edy some of the shortcomings of airline deregulation and also
help to remove some of the additional obstacles created by na-
tional carrier incumbents, which, according to Dr. Polley, have
taken to building alliances rather than engaging in outright
mergers.
V. THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZING MARKETS
In many ways, both successes and failures of the competi-
tion law of deregulation result from an unprecedented expan-
sion of geographic markets across national boundaries. It there-
fore seems worth examining at which level of political decision-
making deregulatory activities should be decided upon. Wolf-
gang Kerber, professor of economics at the University of Mar-
burg, briefed participants on the wealth of recent institutional
economics theory of a "competition of systems." His own prefer-
ence was with emphasizing the merits of assigning competences
to the lower level of state and substate units. Friedl Weiss, pro-
fessor of trade law at the Europa Institute of the University of
Amsterdam, too, took a skeptical stand and resisted climbing on
the bandwagon of those lawyers and economists who propose to
make competition law a WTO competence. The World Trade
Organization should continue to do what it does best, which is to
dismantle state imposed trade barriers in the pursuit of non-dis-
crimination. Judge David A.O. Edward of the Court ofJustice of
the European Community ("Court") put in a note of caution.
With the Court kept busy with numerous complaints of viola-
tions by Member States of EC rules on intra-community trade, he
found the time not yet ripe for the pendulum to swing back to
decision-making on state level.
The question of whether, in Kerber's scenario, jurisdictions
should compete for investment in the same way as companies
compete for sales was left open. So were many other questions
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at the Weimar Symposium. To have raised them and elaborated
upon them at greater length and with considerable expertise in
this issue of Fordham International Law Journal may, however,
serve present understanding and promote future study of that
extra effort that must be taken with regard to the deregulation
of regulated industries. It was the shared view of all participants
that the problems should not be addressed just as they arise one
by one. Instead, they should be looked at in the broader context
of inter-industry and inter-state comparisons.
It falls upon the one guilty of all of the shortcomings-not
of the competition law of deregulation itself but of its treatment
before, during, and after the Weimar Symposium-to express
his gratitude to the authors of the papers, to the participants of
the Symposium including his colleagues Martina Haedrich, Her-
ibert Hirte, Erich Schanze, and Rupert Windisch of the Jena and
Marburg Universities' schools of law and economics for consecu-
tively chairing the discussion, and to the student editors of the
Fordham International Law Journal who did a marvelous job in cop-
ing with so many manuscripts from authors whose first language,
in many cases, was not English. Another word of thanks is defi-
nitely owed to the members of the then team at the Jean Monnet
Chair: Kerstin Bode, Dr. Marc Bungenberg, Christian Carius,
Helge Heinrich, Jan Heithecker and Ellen Wohlleben. Unim-
pressed by the competition law of deregulation, Ulrich Beetz
and Birgit Erichsson of the Weimar based Abegg-Trio and Bern-
hard Klapprott of the Weimar Franz Liszt School of Music, were
the ones to set the priorities right. They played chamber music
of Johann Sebastian Bach, another one time citizen of Weimar,
and thereby gave life to the newly restored charms of the Belve-
dere, an early eighteenth century castle situated in a park just
outside Weimar.
